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Case No. 20110518-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Gary Lee Moody, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for exploitation of a vulnerable adult, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 (West Supp. 2010); and issuing a bad check, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (West Supp. 2009), both third degree 
felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 
2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that the evidence was sufficient to 
support Defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check, justifying denial of 
Defendant's motion for a directed verdict? 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion for directed verdict is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, f 15,167 P.3d 503. On appeal, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom" are 
viewed "in the light most favorable to the party moved against." State v. Jensen, 
2004 UT App 467, f 7, 105 P.3d 951 (citations and additional quotation marks 
omitted), cert denied 123 P.3d 815 (Utah 2005). The Court then "appl[ies] the same 
standard used when reviewing a jury verdict." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 41, 
70 P.3d 111. The trial court's decision will be affirmed "'if, upon reviewing the 
evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the court] 
conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that 
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt/" State v. 
Hart, 2012 UT App 78, p , 704 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (quoting State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 
5, f 29,84 P.3d 1183). 
2. Did the trial court properly reject Defendant's claim that testimony from 
Defendant's parole officer was inadmissible under rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. See Woods v. 
Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, ^ 5, 158 P.3d 552. In so doing, this Court must decide 
"'whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the unfairly prejudicial 
potential of the evidence outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was 
beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
2 
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1992) (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991)) (alteration in 
original). Moreover, "an erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence based on 
rule 403 cannot result in reversible error unless the error is harmful/7 Id. at 240. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 (West Supp. 2009); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West Supp. 2010); and 
Utah Rules of Evidence 401,402, and 403. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Grant and Jeanne Christensen were 85 and 77 years old, respectively, as of 
March 2011. R.194:95-96, 168. The two married in 1953 and had six children, 
twenty-two grandchildren, and seven great-grandchildren. R.194:96. Grant worked 
as a dentist until his retirement in 2006. R.194:99. Thereafter, his health started to 
decline, and he had a number of small strokes and two major strokes that caused 
fibrillations in his heart and affected his memory and mental capacity. R.194:97. 
Jeanne testified that after he had the strokes, her husband would "sit in front of the 
TV for maybe, throughout the day, waiting for the BYU game or a Utah game when 
it [wajsn't [scheduled] for maybe three days." Id. 
1
 Appellate courts "examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 2,6 
P.3d 1116. The State recites the facts accordingly. 
3 
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Before his health problems began, Grant was in charge of the family's 
finances. R.194:99. He maintained a personal banking account with income from 
his dentistry practice, and he would write Jeanne checks for utility bills and for her 
personal use. Id. 
In March 2009, Defendant and his brother Steven came to the Christensens' 
home to discuss an investment opportunity. R.194:99-100. Grant had met 
Defendant while Grant was still practicing dentistry, and Defendant claimed to be 
related to a family named Moody in Defendant's hometown of Delta, Utah. 
R.194:135-36,168,171. When he met with the Christensens at their home, Defendant 
told them about something called a Medsonix device that he claimed not only 
purified water and oil, but also had certain health benefits. R. 194:100,163,170. 
Defendant said that he needed $200 or $300 for fees he had to pay before he could 
access larger sums between $100,000 and $250,000 that were sitting in the bank 
waiting to be used to get his Medsonix invention marketable. R.194:100. Defendant 
claimed that he would lose access to the larger sum if he did not pay the bank the 
fee that day. Id. He further claimed that he would return that afternoon to pay 
Grant back double or triple his investment. R.194:103. Grant gave Defendant the 
$200, but Defendant did not return that afternoon or otherwise repay the money. 
R.194:104-05. 
4 
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Defendant made several subsequent visits to the Christensen home to ask 
Grant for more money, telling him that he would repay double or triple that 
amount. R.194:105. Jeanne kept a record of these visits on a large wall calendar, 
noting the day Defendant visited and the amount he received from her husband. 
R.194:ll-12 (State's Exh. 1). She recorded twenty visits from Defendant between 
March and December of 2009 and remembered that Defendant was calling their 
home up to four times a day by the end of the summer asking for Grant. R.194:105, 
107. Defendant obtained over $4,000 in cash and check payments from Grant 
during that time. R.194:121,151. 
Jeanne was skeptical about Defendant's business proposal from the first visit. 
R.194:104-05. Over the following months, she graduated from letting Grant handle 
Defendant's requests in hopes it would help him rebound from his stroke to arguing 
with him that he should not be giving Defendant anything. R.194:104-05,109-10. By 
August, after her husband had given Defendant nearly $2,000, she told Defendant to 
leave them alone. R.194:107. She explained that her husband was retired, was 
recovering from a stroke, and should not be asked for more money. R.194:107,109, 
111. By late summer, Jeanne's frustration with the situation forced her to persuade 
her husband to let her take over the family's finances, and they agreed that he 
should sign half of the house over to her. R.194:109-10. 
5 
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On August 11, Defendant was in the kitchen asking Grant yet again for more 
money when Jeanne reached her limit. R.194:122-24. She insisted on hand-writing a 
promissory note right then and there so that she would have a record showing they 
had paid money to Defendant. R.194:122. Jeanne did not think Defendant would 
sign a note for all the money they had already given him, so she wrote it in 
anticipation of making future payments to Defendant, put $760 on the note at her 
husband's suggestion, and noted that payment was due within four days or interest 
would begin to accrue. R.194:122-23,143-44; State's Exh. 6. Although he signed the 
note, Defendant never paid it. R.194:124-25. 
Defendant left the Christensens on August 11 without having received any 
money. State's Exh. 5 (attached in Addendum B). The next day, he opened a 
checking account at a local bank without putting any money in it.2 R.194:130; State's 
Exh. 9. On August 15, he wrote a check on that account to the Christensens for $930. 
R.194:126; State's Exh. 7. On August 17, he wrote the Christensens a second 
consecutively-numbered check on the same account for $600. R.194:126; State's Exh. 
8. When he gave the checks to the Christensens, Defendant told them to wait a 
week to ten days before cashing them because there weren't funds in the account to 
cover them. R.194:126-27. A week, then ten days, passed and Defendant told them 
1
 The account would ultimately be closed on November 9 without Defendant 
having ever made a deposit. R.194:130; State's Exh. 9. 
6 
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to hold onto the checks a little longer. R.194:126-27. After that, when the issue 
arose, Defendant said they could not be cashed. R.194:127. Jeanne waited until late 
October or early November trying unsuccessfully to cash the checks. R.194:128. 
After giving the checks to the Christensens, Defendant received at least six 
more payments from Grant: 
• August 25 $100 
• September 30 $250 
• October 14 $150 
• October 27 $200 
• November 13 $250 
• November 24 $200 
See State's Exh. 5. In December 2009, Mrs. Christensen contacted the police about 
the situation, but they declined to act. R.194:139-40. She then took everything to the 
district attorney's office, where an investigation began. Id. 
Defendant never told the Christensens that during the time he was getting 
money from them, he was on parole for previous convictions; he owed $297,000 in 
restitution for those crimes, the terms of his parole barred him from handling 
investment funds, and he and his brother Steven were living in their mother's home. 
R.194:161, 177, 185-86, 201-02. The terms of Defendant's parole agreement also 
required, among other things, that Defendant report to his parole officer any 
employment or business in which he engaged. R.194:174-75. Defendant never 
informed his parole officer, Casey Nelson, about his financial relationship with 
7 
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Grant Christensen or about the fact that he was trying to access investment money 
in a bank account or that he was asking for investment money to market a new 
invention. R.194175. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with exploitation of a vulnerable adult, theft by 
deception, and issuing a bad check or draft, all third degree felonies. R.l-2; R.194:2. 
The State later dropped the theft by deception charge. R.22-23. 
Immediately prior to trial on the remaining charges, Defendant moved to 
preclude admission of any testimony regarding his prior convictions from the 
State's witness, Casey Nelson, who was Defendant's parole officer for the earlier 
offenses.3 R.84-89, 99-101; R.194:3-7. Nelson was expected to tell the jury that 
Defendant failed to inform him about his work regarding the Medsonix invention or 
about the money obtained from the Christensens, both of which violated the terms 
of his parole. R.91, 93; R.194:305. Defendant argued that evidence of the prior 
convictions was inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, and that it 
could not be used for impeachment purposes inasmuch as it was substantially more 
prejudicial than probative under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. R.85-88,91,93; 
R. 194:4-5. The trial court ruled that evidence regarding the prior convictions could 
3
 Defendant pled guilty in 2003 to two counts of securities fraud and one 
count of pattern of unlawful activity, all second-degree felonies. R.90-91. 
8 
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be used only for impeachment purposes, but that Nelson could testify concerning 
the terms of Defendant's parole and his compliance therewith. R.194:7-8 (attached 
in Addendum C). The judge found the latter testimony to "ha[ve] relevance" and 
held that it was not unduly prejudicial given the limited scope in which it would be 
presented. Id. 
During the subsequent jury trial, the State called Nelson and established that 
the terms of Defendant's parole required that he inform Nelson of his employment 
and that he not handle investment funds. R.194:174-75. Nelson explained that 
Defendant never informed him of his involvement with the Medsonix invention or 
about his handling of the Christensens' money. R.194:175. Nelson also revealed 
that the terms of Defendant's parole included a $297,000 restitution debt which was 
delinquent. R.194:177-78. Following Nelson's direct examination, defense counsel 
moved for a mistrial based on the reasons he had provided in his pre-trial motion. 
R. 194:178. The court denied the motion. Id. 
At the end of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict with 
respect to both charges. R.180; R.194:183-84. He argued that the State had provided 
no evidence that he intentionally or knowingly deceived the Christensens, defeating 
the charge of exploiting a vulnerable adult. R. 194:183-84. He also claimed that the 
State failed to establish the charge of issuing a bad check because the evidence failed 
to demonstrate that Defendant was anything but honest when he told the 
9 
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4 
Christensens not to cash his checks because he did not have money in the bank. 
R.194:184. * 
The court denied the motion on both counts. R.194:188 (attached in 
Addendum D). As to Count 1, it held there was sufficient evidence from which a ( 
reasonable juror could draw an inference of intentional or knowing deception. Id. 
As to Count 2, it found that the jury could decide, based on the evidence, what the 
purpose of the checks was at the time they were issued. Id. 
The defense then rested, after which the trial court instructed the jury. 
R.194:190-98. Jury instruction 28 expressly cautioned the jury on its use of the 
testimony concerning Defendant's prior conviction. The instruction provided: 
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was previously 
convicted of a crime. This evidence was brought to your attention only 
to help you evaluate the credibility of the defendant as a witness. Do 
not use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that the defendant is 
guilty of the crimes for which he is now on trial. < 
R.163 (attached in Addendum E). Following deliberations, the jury convicted 
Defendant of both charges. R.176; R.194:216. 
The trial court ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report and 
thereafter sentenced Defendant to concurrent prison terms of not-to-exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison. R. 179; R.183-84. Defendant timely appealed. R.189. 
10 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Issuing a Bad Check, Defendant contends that the evidence failed to 
demonstrate a quid pro quo exchange of something of value in return for the checks 
he issued on an empty bank account because an antecedent debt is not "value" 
under the statute. This Court should decline to review Defendant's claim because 
he failed to preserve the argument he presents to this Court on appeal, and he does 
not argue any exception to the preservation requirement. 
In any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the transaction 
centered on an investment, not an antecedent debt. Defendant issued both checks in 
exchange for money the Christensens' invested in his Medsonix venture, in return 
for which Defendant promised a double or triple return on the investment. As the 
checks need not issue contemporaneously with the value to which they are tied, a 
reasonable jury could have found the requisite exchange to justify the bad check 
conviction. 
Alternatively, the jury could have found that the checks were exchanged for 
additional money from the Christensens. The obvious escalation of Mrs. 
Christensens' efforts to curtail payments on which Defendant had relied for several 
months, as well as the timing of Defendant's efforts to set up a checking account, 
issue checks to the Christensens, and suggest that the checks could be cashed within 
a matter of. days demonstrate that the checks were calculated to make the 
11 
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investment seem stable and to persuade Mrs. Christensen to allow additional 
payments to be made to Defendant. In fact, Mrs. Christensen temporarily • 
surrendered her reluctance to allow future investments by her husband. 
Consequently, the jury could have determined that there was an exchange of value i 
for the bad checks. 
Even if this Court finds that the case involves an antecedent debt, it should 
4 
hold that an antecedent debt is "value" under the bad check statute because other 
sections of the Utah Code define it as "value," and the plaint language of the bad 
i 
check statute itself does not except antecedent debts from its scope. 
II. Exploitation of a Vulnerable Adult The trial court properly admitted 
limited testimony from Defendant's parole officer describing certain terms of 
Defendant's parole and stating whether Defendant had met those terms because the 
evidence was probative and not unfairly prejudicial. Defendant's failure to inform ( 
his parole officer of his work relating to the Medsonix device (required by the terms 
of his parole) and his handling of investment funds from the Christensens 
(prohibited by the terms of his parole) were relevant to the issue of the existence of 
an intentional or knowing deception, which was a contested element of the 
i 
vulnerable adult charge. Specifically, the evidence made it more probable that 
Defendant harbored the necessary deceptive intent in his dealing with the 
Christensens. Further, the existence of a delinquent six-figure restitution debt (part 
12 
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of the terms of his parole) was relevant to the existence of an intent to deceive 
because Defendant's failure to disclose the delinquent debt to the Christensens 
strongly reflected on the veracity of the promised double and triple returns on their 
investment. 
The trial court recognized the potential prejudice of evidence relating to 
Defendant's prior convictions and imposed limitations on the evidence that 
minimized any unfair prejudice: the parties could not mention the specific offenses 
or the facts surrounding them, although the existence of the felony convictions 
could be used for impeachment purposes if it became necessary; the jury was not 
told of the specific source of the restitution debt; the parole officer's testimony was 
not argued inappropriately by either counsel in their closing remarks; and the trial 
court expressly instructed the jury not to consider any evidence relating to a prior 
conviction as proof of Defendant's guilt of the instant charges. Consequently, the 
trial court properly determined that the significant probative value of the evidence 
was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS SUFFICIENCY 
ARGUMENT AND ARGUES NO EXCEPTION TO THE 
PRESERVATION RULE; ALTERNATIVELY, THERE WAS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT 
ISSUED THE CHECKS TO OBTAIN SOMETHING OF VALUE 
13 
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At the close of the State's case, Defendant moved for a directed verdict based 
on insufficient evidence to support a conviction for issuing a bad check, arguing that 
there was no evidence that he obtained anything of value for the checks where the 
parties were all aware that there was no money in the account with which to cash 
the checks. R. 194:184-85. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury thereafter 
found Defendant guilty of the charge. R. 194:188; 215-16. 
Defendant challenges this ruling on appeal, arguing that the State failed to 
establish that he wrote the checks as part of a quid pro quo exchange for something of 
value pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (West Supp. 2009). See Aplt. Br. at 9. 
Specifically, he contends that the statute requires an understanding between the 
parties that the check is issued "in exchange for" something of value, and that this 
element was not met by evidence establishing only that the checks were a good faith 
promise to pay an antecedent debt at some future time. 
This Court should not reach Defendant's sufficiency challenge because he 
presents on appeal an argument which was not put before the trial court and, hence, 
is not preserved for appellate review. In any event, the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences therefrom establish that the checks issued as a return on the Christensens' 
past investments in Medsonix. Alternatively, there was evidence on which the jury 
could find that the checks issued in exchange for continuation of the Christensens' 
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payments. Either way, the evidence sufficed to support the jury's verdict, and this 
Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
A. Defendant did not Preserve his Claim Below and Argues 
Neither Exceptional Circumstances nor Plain Error on Appeal 
A defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or 
objection to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  14-17, 
10 P.3d 346. Defense counsel must raise the issue below "'in such a way that the 
court [was] placed on notice' of the argument" later brought before the appellate 
court. State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89,f9,705 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (quoting State v. 
Diaz-Arevato, 2008 UT App 219, f 10,189 P.3d 85, cert denied 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 
2008)) (explaining that a challenge to an element of a charge in the trial court does 
not preserve for appellate review "every argument that could possibly relate to that 
element"). Preservation is required "unless a defendant can demonstrate that 
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
f 11. This Court may decline to consider an unpreserved issue on appeal where a 
defendant does not argue an exception to the preservation requirement. See State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
Defendant did not preserve below the insufficiency argument he raises to this 
Court. Below, he argued that he did not intend to defraud anyone by issuing the 
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checks4 and that his admission that the checks could not yet be cashed essentially 
transformed the checks into a promissory note, with the parties waiting until 
Defendant had money before expecting him to "make the checks good/' R. 194:184-
85. 
On appeal, Defendant concedes that the agreement between himself and the 
Christensens to refrain from cashing the checks did not remove the transaction from 
application of the bad check statute, section 76-6-505. See Aplt. Br. at 11 (citing State 
v. Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, f t 14,16,138 P.3d 599). Instead, he argues that the 
statute does not apply here because it requires that the checks issue in exchange for 
something of value and that no such exchange occurred in this case because the 
checks represented a repayment of an antecedent debt that does not qualify as the 
requisite quid pro quo exchange under the statute. See id. at 8-13. Defendant's 
argument below did not provide either the prosecutor or the trial court an 
opportunity to address this particular argument and, hence, did not preserve this 
argument for appellate review. See Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, f f 8, 10 (finding 
appellate challenge to an element of the charged crime to be unpreserved where a 
different argument challenging the same element was presented to the trial court). 
4
 An intent to defraud is not required under section 76-6-505. See State v. 
Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, f 22,138 P.3d 599. 
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Because Defendant presents his argument for the first time on appeal and 
makes no attempt to argue for application of an exception to this Court's 
preservation rule, this Court should refuse to grant appellate review of his claim. 
See Pledger, 896 R2d at 1229 n.5. 
B. There was Sufficient Evidence to Convict Defendant of Issuing 
a Bad Check, Justifying the Denial of Defendant's Motion for 
Directed Verdict 
Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure to preserve his claim, it will find 
that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for issuing a bad 
check. Defendant argues that the statute requires a quid pro quo exchange of the 
checks for something of value. See Aplt. Br. at 9-10. He contends that he issued the 
checks as a good faith promise to eventually pay an antecedent debt (previous 
payments he had received from the Christensens), and that the repayment of a loan 
does not qualify as a "thing of value" under the relevant statute. See id. at 9,15. 
The latter claim is contrary to this Court's precedent. See State v. Mower, 2005 
UT App 438, f 14,124 P.3d 265. (check given in exchange for promise to pay a loan 
with interest and/or fees constitutes "thing of value" under bad check statute). 
In any event, the debt herein was not a loan. Instead, the checks were issued 
as a return on the Christensens' investment, not as payment on an antecedent debt. 
The "thing of value" Defendant obtained was the investment money. Alternatively, 
the evidence permitted the jury to determine that the checks were issued in 
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exchange for future payments from the Christensens. In either case, the exchange 
would satisfy the requirements of the bad check statute. 
The statute under which Defendant was convicted provides that, "[a]ny 
person who issues . . . a check... for the purpose of obtaining from any person . . . 
any money, property, or other thing of value.. . knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check " 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1). The plain language of the statute demonstrates that 
its "key is the purpose for which the check is issued. If the check is issued in 
exchange for a thing of value, then the statute applies." State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 
| 39,147 P.3d 448 (check given in exchange for a truck); State v. Bartholomew, 724 
P.2d 352, 354-55 (Utah 1986) (check given in exchange for stock was given for a 
thing of value even though stock certificates were not issued because when shares 
were booked into defendant's account, he had right to order the stock sold and to 
receive any profit); see also Wallace, 2006 UT App 232, f f 3-4 (check given in 
exchange for airline tickets); Mower, 2005 UT App 438, ^  14 (check given in exchange 
for defendant's "right to repayment on the loan, as well as the expectation of interest 
and/or fees."). The purpose behind writing a bad check must be determined "as of 
the moment of issuance, rather than in light of [any] subsequent failure to fulfill [the 
defendant's] obligations." Mower, 2005 UT App 438, ^  8 (citing State v. Herrera, 1999 
UT 64, Tf-4 n.l, 993 P.2d 854 ("'[A] crime consists in the concurrence of prohibited 
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conduct [the bad act] and a culpable mental state [the mens rea].'") (quoting 1 
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 27, at 164-65 (15th ed. 1993)) (alterations 
in original). Further, the exchange need not be contemporaneous in order to violate 
the statute. See Robison, 2006 UT 65, f^ 39 (holding that the passage of a check at a 
time other than the thing of value to which it is linked is not determinative of the 
purpose behind issuance of the check). 
1. The Return on the Christensens' Investment Amounts to 
"Value" 
Defendant contends that his purpose in issuing the checks was to present a 
good faith promise to pay an antecedent debt, i.e., the money given Defendant by 
the Christensens prior to issuance of the checks. See Aplt. Br. at 9,15. He claims 
that an antecedent debt does not amount to a "thing of value" under section 76-6-
505. See id. at 10, 15-17. His position derives from the Utah Supreme Court's 
determination in Howells, Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1977), that 
"payment of an antecedent debt was qualitatively different from a payment made 
for something of value, like . . . goods or services[.]" Robison, 2006 UT 65, % 38 
(paraphrasing Howells, Inc., 565 P.2d at 1149). 
While the question of whether a bad check issued in payment of an 
antecedent debt qualifies as a "thing of value" under section 76-6-505 is unsettled 
(compare Howells, Inc., 565 P.2d at 1149 with Peterson Plumbing Supply v. Bernson, 797 
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P.2d 473, 475 & n.l (Utah App. 1990)), the question need not be decided here 
because this case involves an investment, not an antecedent or pre-existing debt. 
//Investment,, is defined as " [a]n expenditure to acquire property or assets to 
produce revenue." Black's Law Dictionary, 844 (8th Ed. 2004). The series of 
transactions at hand meets this definition, and, in closing arguments, both parties 
characterized the subject of the parties' dealings as an investment. See R.194:205, 
208,211,212-14. From Jeanne's point of view, the money paid to Defendant was to 
obtain larger amounts of money with which to pursue development of the 
Medsonix device and pay a return to investors. R. 194:102-03,153. Grant believed 
that his money was helping Defendant secure the Medsonix device and would help 
him to get it "marketed and used" in and around Utah. R.194:100-04. Both 
positions were fostered by Defendant's indication of "other investors" and his 
singular promise of a return of "double or triple" what they paid plus an additional 
"percentage[.]" R.194:103,110,152,169-71. Defendant did not commit to repaying a 
specific amount but repeatedly indicated that it would be more than the 
Christensens invested. R.109:103, 170-71. Accordingly, the jury could well 
determine that the exchange of money for the right to a future return established a 
business relationship involving an investment opportunity, not an antecedent debt. 
The bad check statute applies if the checks issued in exchange for a "thing of 
value," and the statute identifies money as a thing of value. See Robison, 2006 UT 65, 
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Tf 39; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1). By the time Defendant issued the two 
checks, the Christensens had given him several payments totaling approximately 
$1230.00. R.194:149, State's Exh. 5. When Defendant produced the checks, he said 
only that they were offered in "good faith" and that they should not be cashed for a 
week to ten days. R.194:125-26,148-49. Consequently, when Defendant gave two 
checks totaling $1530.00 to the Christensens, who were expecting the promised 
return on their investment, and he provided no other reason for issuing the checks, 
the jury could interpret the gesture as part of the promised return—in other words, 
that Defendant issued the checks in exchange for the Christensens' money. 
The fact that Defendant wrote the words "loan" and "loan repayment" on the 
checks does not change the fact that he induced the Christensens to give him money 
in anticipation of a return, not as part of a loan agreement. See State's Exh. 7 &c8. 
Nothing suggested that the Christensens ever suspected, let alone understood, that 
the nature of their agreement with Defendant had or was intended to change. The 
Christensens simply knew that an investment was involved. R.194:152-53. 
Further, the delay between the investment payments and the checks does not 
prevent the checks from being exchanged for the Christensens' money: 
The passage of time between the acquisition of the thing of value and 
the passing of the bad check, while relevant, is not the defining 
characteristic of purpose. To the contrary, little can be gleaned about 
the purpose of a bad check from merely knowing whether it was 
passed five seconds or five weeks after the thing of value changed 
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hands. In short, the purpose for passing a bad check may be 
established without any evidence regarding when the check was 
passed relative to when the thing of value to which it is linked was 
acquired. 
Robison, 2006 UT 65, | 39. 
Because the evidence permitted a reasonable jury to determine that the check 
issued in exchange for money, the jury properly convicted Defendant of issuing a 
bad check, and the trial court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict on 
that charge. 
2. Future Payments From the Christensens Amounts to 
"Value" 
Alternatively, the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom permitted 
the jury to find that Defendant issued the checks for the purpose of receiving future 
payments from the Christensens by "provid[ing] the illusion of stability and 
financial propriety" to waylay Jeanne's concerns. See State v. Jackson, 1994 WL 
162338 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.).5 The temporary cessation of Jeanne's efforts to obstruct 
the cash flow and the subsequent payments to Defendant were the "value" required 
under the bad check statute. See Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 39 (the purpose for passing a 
bad check may be established independent of whether the check passed before or 
after the thing of value to which it is linked). 
5
 Jackson is an unpublished opinion. 1994 WL 162338. Hence, while its 
conclusion is relevant, it is not binding authority. 
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In the weeks prior to issuance of the checks, Jeanne was becoming 
increasingly stressed and angered by the situation with Defendant and became 
openly and actively involved in trying to stop the payments to Defendant She tried 
to get her husband to stop investing by talking and arguing with him about the on-
going payments. R. 194:109,121. Late in the summer, she became "so distressed" 
over the situation that she and her husband argued until he finally agreed that he 
would turn over management of the family finances to her from that point forward 
and put part of the house in her name. R. 194:109-10. 
Jeanne also appealed to Defendant to stop asking for money. She explained to 
him that her husband's health problems left him unable to handle this situation, that 
they were retired and could not afford to give him money, and that he was "going 
to cause a divorce" if he continued to insist on money. R. 194:109-11. In response to 
Jeanne's efforts to eliminate a source of income on which he had relied for more 
than four months, Defendant tried repeatedly to speak with Grant outside of 
Jeanne's presence. R.194:109. 
Jeanne reached her limit in August. On August 11, she was in her kitchen 
where her husband and Defendant were discussing yet another payment. R.194:122. 
Feeling "very exasperated" about the situation, she insisted that she "need[ed] to 
have something [in writing] to show that" she and her husband were paying 
Defendant money. R.194:122, 124. She sat down and immediately wrote out a 
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I 
promissory note for $760.00. R.194122; State's Exh. 6. The note, she explained at 
trial, represented money being paid by the Christensens around and after August 
11. R.194:143-44. Defendant signed the note but did not receive any money from 
the Christensens that day. See State's Exhs. 5 & 6. < 
Faced with the readily-apparent increase in Jeanne's frustration, her active 
efforts to stem payments, and her expectation of payment on the promissory note 
within four days, Defendant took immediate action. The day after signing the 
promissory note, he opened a new bank account but did not fund it. R.194:130. 
Over the course of the next five days, he issued the Christensens two checks on that 
account totaling $1530.00. See State's Exhs. 5, 7, 8. When giving the checks to the 
Christensens, he informed them that they could not cash them for "a week or 10 
days," leading the pair to believe the checks could eventually be cashed and, hence, 
had value. Thereafter, Defendant received two more payments in August, one in 
September, two in October, and two in November, for a total of $1,250.00. See 
R.194:126-27; State's Exh. 5. 
Having decided that she was looking to safeguard the money her husband 
would be paying out on and after August 11, Jeanne accepted the checks from 
Defendant. R.194:144-45. In return, she tracked but did not impede several more 
payments from her husband to Defendant. See State's Exhs. 1& 5. It was only after 
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she discovered over two months later that the checks would not cash that she got 
the payments to stop and an investigation to begin. R.194:127-28,139-40. 
From this evidence, the jury could have found that the checks were both 
issued and accepted in exchange for future payments from the Christensens to 
Defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1). Money is a "thing of value" under 
the plain language of the statute, and the fact that the money would not be paid 
until after the checks issued does not defeat Defendant's conviction. See Robison, 
2006 UT 65, [^38 ('The passage of time between the acquisition of the thing of value 
and the passing of the bad check, while relevant, is not the defining characteristic of 
purpose/'). Hence, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find a 
quid pro quo exchange for something of value, defeating Defendant's claim on 
appeal. 
3. An Antecedent Debt Amounts to "Value" 
Even if this Court were to determine that the evidence establishes that the on-
going debt herein amounted to an antecedent debt toward which the checks were 
intended as payments, it should still affirm the trial court's ruling because payment 
on an antecedent debt amounts to "Value." Utah's Commercial Code provides that 
"[a]n instrument is issued for value if... the instrument is issued or transferred as 
payment of, or as security for, an antecedent claim against any person, whether or 
not the claim is due." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-303(l)(c) (West 2004). Similarly, 
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Title 25 of the Utah Bankruptcy Code provides that" [v]alue is given for a transfer or 
an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or 
an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied/' Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-4 (West 2004). 
Moreover, the plain language of the statute does not exclude antecedent debts as a < 
"thing of'value," and no contemporaneous exchange of the checks for the value is 
required. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1). See Robison, 2006 UT 65, Hf39-40 (the 
reasoning of Howells as it relates to antecedent debts must give way to the statute's 
plain language); Bartholomew, 724 P.2d at 352 (not expressly addressing 
contemporaneous exchange but affirming bad check conviction despite one week 
delay between issuance of the check and the receipt of the stock shares the check 
purchased). See, e.g., State v. Cruz, 263 P.3d 890, 892 (NM 2011) (holding that 
worthless payroll checks issued to employees one week after the pay period had 
ended were issued "'in exchange7 for something of value as required to support 
conviction for issuing worthless checks," thus abrogating a ninety-year old rule that 
excluded payments made on antecedent debts from action under New Mexico's bad 
check statute). Hence, evidence that Defendant issued the checks purportedly to 
satisfy an antecedent debt supports his conviction under the bad check statute. 
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POINT II 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PAROLE TERMS AND HIS 
FAILURE TO COMPLY THEREWITH WAS RELEVANT TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN INTENT TO DECEIVE AND WAS NOT 
UNDULY PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence from his 
parole officer, Casey Nelson, that Defendant 
• was previously convicted of a similar offense; 
• was a parolee at the time of the present incident; 
• violated his parole by taking money from the Christensens; 
• failed to inform Nelson about his involvement with the 
Medsonix device; and 
• failed to make payments on his restitution. 
See Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant argues that none of this evidence was relevant to the 
instant prosecution for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult and that, even if it 
was, its prejudicial value far outweighed its probative value. Id. at 19-25. Further, 
he contends, prejudice should be presumed from admission of the testimony. Id. at 
25-26. 
The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony, however, because the 
evidence was not only relevant, but its probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under the Rules of Evidence. Further, 
any error in admission of the evidence was harmless because the remaining 
evidence clearly supported the verdict. 
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A. The Evidence was Relevant to Establishing a Knowing or 
Intentional Deception 
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, allows admission of "[a]ll relevant 
evidence/' Utah R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has "amy tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence/7 Utah R. 
Evid. 401. "[T]he standard for determining the relevancy of evidence is very low, 
and even evidence with the slightest probative value is relevant/7 State v. Martin, 
2002 UT 34, Tf 34,44 P.3d 805 (additional quotations omitted). Additionally/77if the 
evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, 
it is admissible for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the 
defendant to another crime will not render it incompetent/77 State v. Tibbets, 2012 UT 
App 95, f 5,705 Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (quoting State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880,882 (Utah 
1978)) (additional citation omitted). 
Evidence that an accused violated a condition of parole may be admissible as 
probative evidence of a critical issue in a subsequent trial. For example, in People v. 
Argentieri, the New York Supreme Court held that so long as a court "properly 
weigh[s] the probative value against the prejudicial effect of permitting defendant's 
parole officer to testify that defendant was on parole, and that a condition of his 
parole77 was violated, no error occurs. 887 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570-71 (NY A.D. 1 Dept. 
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2009) (citing People v. Alvino, 519 N.E.2d 808, 811 (N.Y 1987)); see also State v. 
Higareda, 777 R2d 302,303-05 (Mont. 1989) (finding parole officer's testimony that 
defendant stated, "I really screwed up," to be highly probative as an admission of 
guilt and not unduly prejudicial, even though the testimony showed that the 
defendant had been previously convicted of a crime). In Argentieri, the court found 
no error in the admission of testimony from Argentieri's parole officer, who testified 
at trial that defendant was on parole, and that a condition of his parole was not to 
open any bank accounts without the parole officer's permission. 887 N.Y.S.2d at 
570. The court held this testimony to be "highly probative of defendant's larcenous 
intent, which was a critical issue at trial, since the evidence raised the inference that 
when defendant opened several checking accounts without notifying his parole 
officer, he intended to use these accounts as part of a check-kiting scheme." Id. at 
570-71. Furthermore, the trial court's limiting instruction minimized any prejudicial 
effect of the evidence. Id. at 571. 
Here, the State sought admission of evidence from Defendant's parole officer 
to aid in establishing the charge of financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, 
which requires that the State prove, among other things, that Defendant obtained 
property from the Christensens by means of an intentional or knowing deception. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 (4)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010). Deception consists of the 
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact relating to services rendered, or 
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the employment of any misrepresentation or false promise. See Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-lll(l)(e). 
In response to Defendant's pre-trial motion to exclude from trial evidence of 
his prior convictions, the trial court ruled that the State could establish the fact that 
Defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving a crime of dishonesty, but 
only for impeachment purposes. R. 194:7-8. The court found that for all other 
purposes, the evidence was inadmissible under rule 404(b) because the probative 
value of the details was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.6 
R.194:7-10. However, the judge allowed the parole officer to briefly discuss various 
terms of Defendant's parole and his performance relating thereto, i.e., the 
requirement that he report his employment to his parole officer and the requirement 
that he not handle investment funds. R. 194:7. The court reasoned that these 
matters were not only relevant, but that their probative value was not substantially 
outweighed by their potential for unfair prejudice under rule 403. See id. 
Nelson established that the terms of Defendant's parole require that he work 
at least 32 hours per week at a job that is legal and does not violate the remainder of 
the terms of his parole, that he report his employment to his parole officer to ensure 
6
 Although Defendant challenged admission of the evidence below under rule 
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, he does not do so on appeal. Instead, he limits his 
appellate challenge to rules 401,402 and 403. See Aplt. Br. at 19-26. 
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compliance, that he not handle investment money, and that he disclose to his parole 
officer any financial information. R. 194:174-77. Nelson testified that Defendant 
claimed to be employed as an independent web developer but never disclosed 
anything about working in any way with the Medsonix device. R.194.174. Neither, 
he explained, did Defendant mention that he had investment-related money in an 
account that he was having trouble accessing or that he was soliciting investment 
money related to the Medsonix device. R.194:175-76. 
Defendant contends that his failure to report this information to Nelson was 
irrelevant because he "could have had other motivations'7 for his silence besides an 
intent to deceive Mr. Christensen. Aplt. Br. at 22-23. His failure to suggest any 
other motivation, however, defeats his argument. 
In fact, the evidence is relevant because it makes it more probable that 
Defendant intentionally or knowingly deceived the Christensens to obtain their 
money. His silence about his efforts relating to the Medsonix device raises the 
reasonable inference that no duty to disclose arose because the device did not exist, 
leaving the jury to determine that Defendant obtained the Christensens' money by 
misrepresenting a material fact—the existence of the device. 
Alternatively, Defendant's silence may also suggest that the device existed but 
was not disclosed to Defendant's parole officer out of fear of admitting to a parole 
violation. R. 194:179-81. In other words, Defendant knew that his soliciting of 
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i 
investment funds for the device violated the terms of his parole, yet he persisted in 
those efforts and intentionally omitted this important information from his dealings 
with the Christensens, making it more probable that Defendant obtained the 
Christensens7 money by knowingly and intentionally concealing the information. 
Defendant's parole terms also required that he pay $297,000 in restitution. 
R.194:177-78. The trial judge allowed evidence of the huge debt and the fact that 
Defendant was delinquent in his payments, explaining that Defendant's promise to 
the Christensens of a double and triple return on their investment at a time when he 
already had a "debt that is so substantial that it would choke a horse . . . is 
relevant[.]" R. 194:11. 
The trial court's reasoning was justified. It is undisputed that Defendant 
represented to the Christensens that they would receive double or triple their 
investment in the Medsonix device and that he had hundreds of thousands of 
dollars already in the bank. R. 194:100-03,170-71. The fact that, at the same time, 
he owed an exceedingly large and delinquent debt not only deprived the 
Christensens of a fact material to their decision to give him money, but strongly 
reflected on the veracity of his promises of a huge return. Hence, the information 
was relevant. See, e.g., State v. Schwerike, 2009 UT App 345, f 15,222 P.3d 768 (in the 
context of securities fraud, the unpaid debt of one soliciting investment funds is 
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relevant to his representations to potential investors), cert denied 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 
2010). 
Defendant argues that the State "could have demonstrated" this 
"inflammatory'7 evidence by some other means. Aplt. Br. at 23. Although that may 
be true, Defendant fails to establish that Nelson's brief recounting was unnecessarily 
inflammatory. R. 194:177-78. Nelson simply testified on direct that Defendant was 
ordered to pay $297,000 in restitution as a condition of parole, that restitution was 
money owed by Defendant "to a previous party[,]" and that Defendant was 
delinquent on the debt. Id. If the information was rendered "inflammatory," it was 
only as a result of defense counsel who, on cross-examination, established that 
defendant "was taken back to prison because he was behind, delinquent [sic] on the 
payment of his restitution[.]" R. 194:179. Any undue emphasis on the information 
is solely the fault of Defendant. 
Accordingly, the evidence regarding Defendant's parole status, the terms 
thereof, and his restitution debt, together with his failure to fully inform his parole 
officer or the Christensens of the information, tended to make Defendant's intent to 
deceive the Christensens more probable than without the evidence and, hence, was 
relevant to the State's ability to establish the charge of financial exploitation of a 
vulnerable adult. 
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B. The Evidence was not Unfairly Prejudicial Under Rule 403 
Defendant also claims that the prejudicial impact of the parole information 
substantially outweighed any minimal probative value, in violation of rule of 
evidence 403. See Aplt. Br. at 19, 24-25. Specifically, he argues that the evidence 
might have caused the jury to base its verdict on his criminal history and parole 
violations. See id. at 24-25. 
However, "prejudice alone is not sufficient justification to exclude the 
evidence. Rather, the balancing test under rule 403 requires measuring the danger 
of unfair prejudice/7 Woods v. Zeluff, 2007 UT App 84, ^ 7,158 P.3d 552 (emphasis 
added). Specifically, Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, excludes relevant evidence 
only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice/' Utah R. Evid. 403. Hence, even if some degree of unfair prejudice exists, 
"'[t]he mere fact that evidence possesses a tendency to suggest a decision upon an 
improper basis does not require exclusion; evidence may be excluded only I the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the 
proffered evidence/" Schwenke, 2009 UT App 345, ^ 17 (quoting Woods, 2007 UT 
App 84, Tf 8) (additional quotations omitted). Moreover, the probative testimony of 
a parole officer is not per se inadmissible or violative of the rule. See, e.g., United 
States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106,1115 (5th Cir. 1993) ("We add our voice to the chorus of 
these cases insofar as they reject an inflexible holding that a trial court's decision to 
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allow a defendant's parole officer to testify against the defendant is a per se 
violation of Rule 403.") (and cases cited therein). 
Most of Defendant's argument focuses on his assertion that the jury was 
informed that he was previously convicted of a "similar crime." Aplt. Br. at 24-25. 
In fact, reference to "similar crime" was made only once. The prosecutor asked 
Nelson on direct why he would be interested in Defendant's employment, to which 
Nelson responded: 
One of the things that parolees must do is work at least 32 hours 
a week. So we need to monitor that. Also, we need to insure that it's 
legal employment and also that the employment he chooses is in good 
standing with the rest of his probation agreements. And just to clarify 
what that means, for example, if someone has a no alcohol clause, they 
can't get a job at a bar and likewise if any other crimes that would put 
them in a position to reoffend to a similar crime [sic]." 
R. 194:176 (emphasis added). The statement simply notes that parole requirements 
generally require a parolee to find a job that will not tempt them to reoffend in a 
manner similar to the charge for which they are on parole. To the extent it suggests 
that Defendant was on parole for a crime similar to the one at hand, it was not 
unduly prejudicial. It was a single statement made in the middle of trial, and it 
received no objection by defense counsel and no comment by either party. Instead, 
questioning immediately turned to Defendant's job as a web developer. R.194:177. 
Neither counsel referenced the comment or suggested a similarity between 
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Defendant's prior convictions and the instant charge during the remainder of the 
trial or in their closing remarks. 
In fact, the trial court imposed limitations on Nelson's testimony that 
reasonably assured that the evidence would be more probative than prejudicial. See 
State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, f 23, 72 P.3d 127, reh'g denied (July 8, 2003). 
The court was cognizant of the prejudice to be had from admission of too much 
information relating to the prior convictions and, hence, limited the admissible 
evidence to the parole terms and Defendant's performance pursuant to those terms. 
The limitation acted to ensure only the relevant, probative evidence was admitted 
while at the same time minimizing any potential prejudice. The jury not informed 
of the specific crimes for which Defendant was on parole, minimizing its ability to 
compare the past crimes with the present charges. Neither was the jury given the 
specific source of the restitution debt. It was simply told that the debt represented 
money Defendant owed to someone and had to pay back. R.194:178. 
Further, any remaining temptation for the jury to assume a similarity between 
Defendant's prior offense and the instant charge was put to rest by the trial court's 
limiting instruction to the jury: 
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was previously 
convicted of a crime. This evidence was brought to your attention only 
to help you evaluate the credibility of the defendant as a witness. Do 
not use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that the defendant is 
guilty of the crimes for which he is now on trial. 
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R. 163 (jury instr. 28). Both parties acquiesced in the instruction, and nothing 
indicates the jury was unable to follow it See State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937-38 
(Utah 1988) (no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence with significant probative 
value where court gave a limiting instruction that reduced the potential for 
prejudice arising from the evidence). 
In light of the care with which the court and both counsel handled the 
evidence relating to Defendant's parole terms and restitution, and the written 
instruction approved by the parties and provided to the jury, the probative value of 
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
and Defendant's appellate claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's convictions. 
iL 
Respectfully submitted April /_/_, 2012. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney^General 
TQHS-C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Chs. 6 to End 
2009 
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part 
For Use In 2009-2010 
1
 Supplementing 2004 main volume 
Includes Laws through the 
58th Legislature, General Session 
and the First Special Session 
§ 76-6-505. Issuing: a bad check or draft—Presumption 
(l)(a) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, 
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will 
not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person who issues a check or draft for which 
payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be 
paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, 
or other thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of 
which check or draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft 
if he fails to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check 
or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a 
period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the offense is a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, 
the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, 
the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a 
second degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-505; Laws 1977, c. 91, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 92, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 16, eft. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 2007, c. 306, § 99, eff. April 30, 2007. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reub n Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Includes Laws through the 
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76-5-111. Abuse, neglect, or exploitat ion of a vulnerable adu l t—Pena l t i es 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Abandonment" means a knowing or intentional action or inaction, including deser-
tion, by a person or entity acting as a caretaker for a vulnerable adult that leaves the 
vulnerable adult without the means or ability to obtain necessary food, clothing, shelter, or 
medical or other health care. 
(b) "Abuse" means: 
(i) attempting to cause harm, intentionally or knowingly causing harm, or intentionally 
or knowingly placing another in fear of imminent harm; 
(ii) causing physical injury by knowing or intentional acts or omissions; 
(iii) unreasonable or inappropriate use of physical restraint, medication, or isolation 
that causes or is likely to cause harm to a vulnerable adult that is in conflict with a 
physician's orders or used as an unauthorized substitute for treatment, unless that 
conduct furthers the health and safety of the adult; or 
(iv) deprivation of life-sustaining treatment, except: 
(A) as provided in Title 75, Chapter 2a, Advance Health Care Directive Act; or 
(B) when informed consent, as defined in this section, has been obtained. 
(c) "Business relationship" means a relationship between two or more individuals or 
entities whei'e there exists an oral or written agreement for the exchange of goods or 
services. 
(d) "Caretaker" means any person, entity, corporation, or public institution that assumes 
the responsibility to provide a vulnerable adult with care, food, shelter, clothing, supervi-
sion, medical or other health care, or other necessities. "Caretaker" includes a relative by 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON § 76-5-111 
blood or marriage, a household- member, a person who is employed or who provides 
volunteer work, or a person who contracts or is under court order to provide care. 
(e) "Deception" means: 
(i) a misrepresentation or concealment: 
(A) of a material fact relating to services rendered, disposition of property, or use of 
property intended to benefit a vulnerable adult; 
(B) of the terms of a contract or agreement entered into with a vulnerable adult; or 
(C) relating to the existing or preexisting condition of any property involved in a 
contract or agreement entered into with a vulnerable adult; or 
(ii) the use or employment of any misrepresentation, false pretense, or false promise in 
order to induce, encourage, or solicit a vulnerable adult to enter into a contract or 
agreement. 
(f) "Elder adult" means a person 65 years of age or older. ' 
(g) "Endeavor" means to attempt or try. 
(h) "Exploitation" means the offense described in Subsection (4). 
(i) "Harm" means pain, mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or psychologi-
cal damage, physical injury, suffering, or distress inflicted knowingly or intentionally. 
(j) "Informed consent" means: 
(i) a written expression by the person or authorized by the person, stating that the 
person fully understands the potential risks and benefits of the withdrawal of food, water, 
medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, heating, or other services necessary to 
maintain minimum physical or mental health, and that the person desires that the 
services be withdrawn. A written expression is valid only if the person is of sound mind 
when the consent is given, and the consent is witnessed by at least two individuals who 
do not benefit from the withdrawal of services; or 
(ii) consent to withdraw food, water, medication, medical services, shelter, cooling, 
heating, or other services necessary to maintain minimum physical or mental health, as 
permitted by court order. 
(k) "Intimidation" means communication conveyed through verbal or nonverbal conduct 
which threatens deprivation of money, food, clothing, medicine, shelter, social interaction, 
supervision, health care, or companionship, or which threatens isolation or harm. 
(/, )(i) "Isolation" means knowingly or intentionally preventing a vulnerable adult from 
having contact with another person by: 
(A) preventing the vulnerable adult from receiving visitors, mail, or telephone calls, 
contrary to the express wishes of the vulnerable adult, including communicating to a 
visitor that the vulnerable adult is not present or does not want to meet with or talk to 
the visitor, knowing that communication to be false; 
(B) physically restraining the vulnerable adult in order to prevent the vulnerable 
'
;
 adult from meeting with a visitor; or 
(C) making false or misleading statements to the vulnerable adult in order to induce 
the vulnerable adult to refuse to receive communication from visitors or other family 
members. 
(ii) The term "isolation" does not include an act intended to protect the physical or 
mental welfare of the vulnerable adult or an act performed pursuant to the treatment 
plan or instructions of a physician or other professional advisor of the vulnerable adult. 
(m) "Lacks capacity to consent" means an impairment by reason of mental illness, 
developmental disability, organic brain disorder, physical illness or disability, chronic use of 
drugs, chronic intoxication, short-term memory loss, or other cause to the extent that a 
vulnerable adult lacks sufficient understanding of the nature or consequences of decisions 
concerning the adult's person or property. 
(n) "Neglect" means: 
(i) failure of a caretaker to provide nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, personal 
care, or dental or other health care, or failure to provide protection from health and 
safety hazards or maltreatment; 
(ii) failure of a caretaker to provide care to a vulnerable adult in a timely manner and 
with the degree of care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise; 
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§ 76-5-111 CRIMINAL CODE 
(iii) a pattern of conduct by a caretaker, without the vulnerable adult's informed 
consent, resulting in deprivation of food, water, medication, health care, shelter, cooling, 
heating, or other services necessary to maintain the vulnerable adult's well being; 
(iv) intentional failure by a caretaker to carry out a prescribed treatment plan that 
results or could result in physical injury or physical harm; or 
(v) abandonment by a caretaker, 
(o) "Physical injury" includes damage to any bodily tissue caused by nontherapeutic 
conduct, to the extent that the tissue must undergo a healing process in order to be 
restored to a sound and healthy condition, or damage to any bodily tissue to the extent that 
the tissue cannot be restored to a sound and healthy condition. "Physical injury" includes 
r
 skin bruising, a dislocation, physical pain, illness, impairment of physical function, a 
pressure sore, bleeding, malnutrition, dehydration, a burn, a bone fracture, a subdural 
hematoma, soft tissue swelling, injury to any internal organ, or any other physical condition 
that imperils the health or welfare of the vulnerable adult and is not a serious physical 
injury as defined in this section, 
(p) "Position of trust and confidence" means the position of a person who: 
(i) is a parent, spouse, adult child, or other relative by blood or marriage of a 
vulnerable adult; 
(ii) is a joint tenant or tenant in common with a vulnerable adult; 
(iii) has a legal or fiduciary relationship with a vulnerable adult, including a court-
appointed or voluntary guardian, trustee, attorney, or conservator; or 
(iv) is a caretaker of a vulnerable adult, 
(q) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of physical injuries that: 
(i) seriously impairs a vulnerable adult's health; 
(ii) was caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(iii) involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to a vulnerable adult; 
or 
(iv) creates a reasonable risk of death, 
(r) "Sexual exploitation" means the production, distribution, possession, or possession 
with the intent to distribute material or a live performance depicting a nude or partially 
nude vulnerable adult who lacks the capacity to consent, for the purpose of sexual arousal 
of any person. 
(s) "Undue influence" occurs when a person uses the person's role, relationship, or power 
to exploit, or knowingly assist or cause another to exploit, the trust, dependency, or fear of 
a vulnerable adult, or uses the person's role, relationship, or power to gain control 
deceptively over the decision making of the vulnerable adult. 
(t) "Vulnerable adult" means an elder adult, or an adult 18 years of age or older who has 
a mental or physical impairment which substantially affects that person's ability to: 
(i) provide personal protection; 
(ii) provide necessities such as food, shelter, clothing, or medical or other health care; 
(iii) obtain services necessary for health, safety, or welfare; 
(iv) carry out the activities of daily living; 
(v) manage the adult's own resources; or 
(vi) comprehend the nature and consequences of remaining in a situation of abuse, 
neglect, or exploitation. 
(2) Under any circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury, any person, 
including a caretaker, who causes a vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of a vulnerable adult, causes or permits that adult's person or 
health to be injured, or causes or permits a vulnerable adult to be placed in a situation where 
the adult's person or health is endangered, is guilty of the offense of aggravated abuse of a 
vulnerable adult as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a second degree felony; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is third degree felony; and 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury 
any person, including a caretaker, who causes a vulnerable adult to suffer harm, abuse, or 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON § 76-5-111 
neglect; or, having the care or custody of a vulnerable adult, causes or permits that adult's 
person or health to be injured, abused, or neglected, or causes or permits a vulnerable adult 
to be placed in a situation where the adult's person or health is endangered, is guilty of the 
offense of abuse of a vulnerable adult as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor. 
(4)(a) A person commits the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult when the person: 
(i) is in a position of trust and confidence, or has a business relationship, with the 
vulnerable adult or has undue influence over the vulnerable adult and knowingly, by 
deception or intimidation, obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, the vulnerable 
adult's funds, credit, assets, or other property with the intent to temporarily or 
permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, benefit, or possession of the adult's 
property, for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
(ii) knows or should know that the vulnerable adult lacks the capacity to consent, and 
obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or use, or assists another in obtaining or using or 
endeavoring to obtain or use, the vulnerable adult's funds, assets, or property with the 
intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the vulnerable adult of the use, benefit, or 
} possession of his property for the benefit of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
(iii) unjustly or improperly uses or manages the resources of a vulnerable adult for the 
profit or advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
(iv) unjustly or improperly uses a vulnerable adult's power of attorney or guardianship 
• for the profit or advantage of someone other than the vulnerable adult; 
(v) involves a vulnerable adult who lacks the capacity to consent in the facilitation or 
furtherance of any criminal activity; or 
(vi) commits sexual exploitation of a vulnerable adult. 
•; (b) A person is guilty of the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult as follows: 
(i) if done intentionally or knowingly and the aggregate value of the resources used or 
the profit made is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony; 
(ii) if done intentionally or knowingly and the aggregate value of the resources used or 
the profit made is less than $5,000 or cannot be determined, the offense is a third degree 
felony; 
(iii) if clone recklessly, the offense is a class A misdemeanor; or 
(iv) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(5) It does not constitute a defense to a prosecution for any violation of this section that the 
accused did not know the age of the victim. 
(.6) An adult is not considered abused, neglected, or a vulnerable adult for the reason that 
the adult has chosen to rely solely upon religious, nonmedical forms of healing in lieu of 
medical care. 
Laws 1996, c. 130, § 14, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 289, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2002, c. 108, 
§ 23, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2007, c. 31, § 26, eff. Jan. 1, 2008. 
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RULE 401 . DEFINITION OF 'RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IR-
RELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the' United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403 . EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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take it this is your Motion in Limine? 
MR. WILSON: It is my motion. 
THE COURT: And I'll deny it. I'll deny it based 
upon the fact that it has relevance and to its limited scope 
in terms of how it's presented as represented by the State, 
it's not so unduly prejudicial as to influence the - or d 
whatever the standards required associated with 403. 
I also have this motion associated with prior 
convictions. I've read it — 
MR. WILSON: That was the second thing I was going 
to (inaudible). 
THE COURT: I've read it. Let's have the State 
respond and then if Mr. Wilson needs to respond, we'll go 
from there. 
MS. COOK: Your Honor, thank you. And the State's 
response to the Motion in Limine is two-pronged. Let me 
actually address the second prong first. 
THE COURT: The second prong is really the only one 
to which you're going to get some relief from the Court. Is 
that helpful? 
MS. COOK: It's my understanding that the defendant 
intends to take the stand.' 
THE COURT: I'm going to grant the Motion in Limine 
to this' extent,•that.is, but for impeachment purposes the 
issues associated with his prior convictions won't be subject 
7 
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to disclosure during the course of the trial. But, based 
upon impeachment, if Mr. Moody puts himself in a position 
where impeachment is appropriate, it may be allowable. Does 
that give you enough —.. 
MR. WILSON: And to what extent? 
THE COURT: - of a guideline? 
MR. WILSON: And to what extent? 
THE COURT: Let me take a look at my notes. 
MR. WILSON: You note, Your Honor, that this is a 
2002 case that we're referring to. It's nine years. 
THE COURT: I read the material. I've read your 
arguments and: I think that your argument associated with its 
use is appropriate and should be barred but for impeachment. 
This - if Mr. Moody intends to offer evidence that ultimately 
suggests that he was involved in a dishonest or false 
statement, then the Court is going to allow it for purposes 
of impeachment. And I think what we'll have to see, we'll 
just have to see where we go. You make that argument — 
MR. WILSON: I'd like to address it now because it 
will in some way affect my decision as to whether to call him 
as a witness. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then let's explore it. 
MR. WILSON: I object to it being brought up 
period, as my motion shows. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
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we're required to prove. Based on the elements before Your 
Honor, I think that's sufficient evidence for the jury to 
make the decision. 
THE COURT: I appreciate your arguments. 
As to the issuance of a bad check or draft, it's a 
close call I think for purposes of this Court but I think 
ultimately it's proper for the Court to deny the directed 
verdict, I'm going to deny them both on Instruction No. 32, 
exploitation of a vulnerable adult because there certainly is 
evidence that a reasonable juror may draw an inference from 
associated with the intent. 
As to Instruction No. 33, it's a question that I'll 
leave to the jury ultimately associated with what the purpose 
1
 and intent of the check was at the time it was issued. Given 
the testimony, as I say, it'll be an interesting one for the 
jury but I think it's one for the jury to decide. Therefore, 
the motion for directed verdict is denied. 
Any alterations or suggestions to the instructions? 
MR. WILSON: No. 32, the intimidation - the 
intimidation should be taken out of No. 32 because there's no 
proof of that and let's just get it down to bare bones, 
endeavor to obtain or use - you know, he did obtain so let's 
just get take out endeavor to obtain out of there as well. 
THE COURT: This is how the statute reads; is that 
correct? 
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Instruction No. A* 
Evidence has been presented that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime. This 
evidence was brought to your attention only to help you evaluate the credibility of the 
defendant as a witness. Do not use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that the 
defendant is guilty of the crimes for which he is now on trial. 
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